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Abstract
In this paper, I first argue that, since the British mandate, citizenship regulations in 
Palestine contributed to dispossession of the rights of Palestinians, thus laying the 
seeds of the Palestinian refugee problem and its eventual consolidation. 1 then argue 
that citizenship regulations in host countries were exclusionary towards refugees in 
general, and Palestinians in particular, making it impossible for Palestinians to inte­
grate in host societies. The so-called “Arab Spring” did not bring about any change in 
that sense. Finally, I argue that the narrative of statehood, although often separated 
from that of the “right of return”, constitutes but one narrative, and one from a com­
pletely different angle than the narrative of a “right of return”, where the ‘just solution’ 
creates the possibility of establishing a homeland for Palestinians where they, and in 
particular the stateless refugees, can be converted into full citizens. What was part of 
the problem for refugees is presented as part of the solution. This discussion is very 
important in today’s Palestine, which was just recently accepted by the u n  General 
Assembly as a non-member observer state. The importance of that move is the official 
Palestinian insistence on the need for a state on the 1967 borders, and the willingness 
to accept the formula of a two-state solution. Discussion related to citizenship and 
refugee status, and the right of return, are all back at the center of political and legal 
discussions.
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I Introduction
The story this paper tells about citizenship is unconventional. Rather than a 
tool empowering individuals by granting them certain rights and freedoms by, 
and within, a state, Palestinian citizenship was first crafted in historic Palestine 
by a colonial regime, and aimed at realizing a colonial project The “Balfour 
Declaration” was embedded in the League of Nations’ Mandate, as an inherent 
objective in Palestine, for which the British authorities were entrusted and 
empowered to take the necessary steps, including the adoption of a nationality 
law.1 The 1925 Citizenship Order, which was amended several times throughout 
the mandate years, constituted the ‘nationality law’ of Palestine, which was 
referred to in Article 7 of the Palestine Mandate.2 Such citizenship is an artificial
1 It is noteworthy that the League of Nations Palestine Mandate did not distinguish between 
nationality and citizenship, while the British Mandate preferred the use of citizenship, at least 
in the legislative texts -  which arguably was meant to advance the narrative of allegiance to 
the state (which citizenship emphasizes), rather than membership to a community or 
belonging to a nation, defined by race, religion, or by other sources of identity definition 
(which nationality reflects). See: Mutaz Qafisheh, The International Law Foundations of 
Palestinian Nationality: A Legal Examination of Palestinian Nationality under the British Rule, 
These de Doctorat (Geneve, CH: Universite de Gen&ve, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales, 2007) 99. That is why Qafisheh defined both nationality or citizenship from 
the legal perspective to mean the “legal link between an individual and a sovereign, which 
has an international legal personality and is normally (but not exclusively) an independent 
state” (Qafisheh, 2). That definition stems from the jurisprudence of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case: “[Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a 
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.” The Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 
Judgment, Second Phase, 6 April 1955—ICJ Reports, 1955,23 cited in: (Qafisheh, 2). Contrary 
to Qafisheh (99), however, I keep the distinction between nationality and citizenship, as they 
do not mean the same thing. The distinction helped the British Mandate accommodate, at 
least legally speaking, under one new demos, two old ethnos, 'Arabs’ and ‘Jews’. To use the 
words of British Mandate Attorney General, Norman Bentwich, without necessarily approv­
ing them or disapproving them for that purpose: “Arabs and Jews in Palestine claim respec­
tively to have Arab and Jewish nationality, but they are equally Palestinian citizens.” Norman 
Bentwich, "Palestine Nationality and the Mandate,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law, Third Series 21, no. 4 (1939): 231.
2 Qafisheh, 97. Article 7 of the Palestine Mandate states: “The Administration of Palestine shall 
be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions 
framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their 
permanent residence in Palestine.” The Palestine Mandate, adopted by the Council of the 
League of Nations in London, on 24 July 1922, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th 
_century/palmanda.asp.
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legal institution, a state articulated one, which admitted pre-existent individu­
als only if they satisfied retroactively the state’s new conditions. The law 
excluded many others, and helped admit new subjects, enabling them as natu­
ralized citizens, to become part of the new constituency of Palestine -  a con­
stituency which was not composed solely of Arab residents of Palestine and/or 
former Ottoman nationals.
Palestinian citizenship, in the way the British mandate shaped it, certainly 
undermined Palestinians’ right to self-determination as a people. But it also 
helped crystallize their pre-existent identity as a people distinguishable from 
other populations under the Ottoman Empire, into a separate national move­
ment, that developed in later decades and led to the establishment of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (p l o ) in 1964. It further served as a reference 
for the p l o , a foundational source for their national movement, making it pos­
sible to argue that Palestinians’ forced displacement in 1948 did not under­
mine the oneness of the Palestinian people, whether those who remained in 
historical Palestine (albeit divided in three different states: Israel, the West 
Bank as annexed to Jordan, and Gaza as administered by Egypt) or those dis­
persed in host countries, the 1948 refugees.3
Alas, this is the only possible legal and historical foundation for modem 
Palestinian citizenship. British-Palestinian citizenship served the Palestinian 
national movement in the same way that original sin served understanding the 
surrounding world in Christian theology. That considering original sin as the foun­
dation of world humanity, the presumption underlying the conception was its 
key ingredient Instead of focusing on the role original sin played in the distortion 
from the original plan, the crucial feature is the original plan, a plan that obviously 
pre-existed and preceded original sin. That plan postulated an ideal world, which 
necessarily existed as a logical foundation for Christian existence, an ideal that can 
be confronted as unrealistic, on the one hand, or as a non-existent reality on the 
other hand. The issue in Christianity is not whether the ideal world historically 
preceded the original sin or not, as it is a matter of faith; faith is a reality that tran­
scends historicity. Transcending historicity does not mean that faith was not some­
thing real, but that the reality postulated by faith is a metaphysical order.
3 Although generally interesting and clearly related to the topic I deal with in this paper, I will 
not deal with the way Palestinians conceived themselves as a nation, separate from neigh­
boring Arab nations, in particular in the plo Charter of 1964/1968, nor the way the interna­
tional community conceived them, as appears in various resolutions and declarations. For 
more, see my earlier study: Asem Khalil, Palestinian Nationality and Citizenship: Current 
Challenges and Future Perspectives, Carim Research Reports 2007/07, Florence, it : Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute 2007.
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Similarly, before the British mandate made the provision for citizenship, the 
pre-existent and idealistic identity of the Palestinians as a people presumed 
as a logical foundation of a Palestinian national movement existed, a presump­
tion, as in all national movements, with no need for historical or legal proof. 
Faith in the presumption of a pre-existing nation keeps the national move­
ment alive. As in Christianity, this should not be interpreted to mean that 
nationality did not exist historically and/or legally but that the historical and/ 
or legal pre-existence simply does not matter.
Taking into consideration the 1948 catastrophe, what Palestinians call the 
Nakba, Palestinian citizenship was distorted further as a result of the establish­
ment of the state of Israel, and the demise of Palestinian citizenship as a mat­
ter of fact due to the lack of a proper state for the Palestinians. The West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem, became part of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip was under 
direct Egyptian control. In 1967, a new distortion took place. The West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip fell under Israeli occupation. Only those granted an identi­
fication number were admitted as residents of the areas under Israeli occupa­
tion, who, after the Oslo Accords, became the “citizens” of the Palestinian 
Authority (residents of the “Areas”).
The regulation of citizenship and/or legal residency was used in all those 
three occasions to exclude some Palestinians from being admitted as citizens 
or legal residents, making it impossible for those excluded to enjoy those mini­
mum rights related to that legal institution of citizenship and residency. Those 
excluded have to find alternative places of legal residence outside Palestine. 
The thousands of Palestinian refugees became de facto and de jure stateless 
persons. They found refuge in neighboring Arab countries. Citizenship was not 
something host countries were ready to offer -  with the exception of Jordan, 
although the provision of citizenship in Jordan was offered only for territorial 
purposes, namely, as a result of unification/annexation of the West Bank in the 
newly established Hashemite Kingdom.4
As a result, most Palestinian refugees were more fragile than most other refu­
gee populations because of their being stateless in Arab countries, countries 
that already had a poor track record with respect to basic rights and freedoms
4 Contrary to what appears in the literature in describing Jordan as an exception to the overall 
attitude towards Palestinians, and the Palestinian refugees in particular, I have argued that 
Jordan is no different than other states as the Jordanian nationality law applied a territorial 
clause only. This means it was inclusive only to those who satisfied the conditions provided 
by the nationality law, and all others were excluded, in particular those Palestinians of Gaza 
Strip who were under Egyptian control from 1948 to 1967. For more, see Asem Khalil, 
“Socioeconomic Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,” International Jounal of 
Refugee Law 23, no. 4 (2011): 680-719.
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even for their own citizens, and because they are the only refugee community 
who are excluded from being covered by the protection of the International 
Refugee Convention.5
II Palestinian Citizenship under the British Mandate
Palestine before the British occupation and mandate was part of the Ottoman 
Empire. Palestinians were Ottoman nationals, subject to the Ottoman Nationa­
lity Law of 1869.6 With the British Mandate, citizenship was now provided by 
the British Mandate Citizenship Order of 1925 (hereafter, the Order). By study­
ing this Order, it is not my intention, however important, to give a legal founda­
tion for Palestinians’ plea for their return, as many typical refugee papers do. 
Rather, I limit my discussion to showing how the new citizenship law helped 
the British Mandate to realize the main objective of the Mandate: enabling the 
establishment of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine.
Before going into details, one cannot but notice how -  and contrary to the 
increasingly common wisdom in contemporary states where citizenship is 
often connected to sovereign and independent states only -  at the time of the 
League of Nations, the fact that Palestine under British Mandate was not a sov­
ereign and independent state did not present any obstacle to adopting a 
nationality law.7 Such experience of legislating, including the writing of new 
constitutions, while still under foreign control and before independence was 
rather a common experience in the region at the time. It is noteworthy, how­
ever, that “the Palestinian Citizenship Order was the only ‘nationality law’ pro­
vided within a mandate text. It was also the only nationality law enacted by 
Britain, in all the territories assigned to it as a Mandatory.”8
5 For more about the so-called ‘protection gap’ and the way it affects Palestinian refugees, see 
Khalil aou.
6 Such historical and legal experiences serve to understand the way the British Mandate dealt 
with Palestinian nationals before enactment of the British-Palestinian citizenship law in 1925, 
and also to understand how Ottoman nationality constituted a source of entitlement for some 
individuals to acquire the British-Palestinian citizenship. Other than that, such experiences 
are not relevant for our purposes in this paper. For a discussion, see chapter 3 of Qafisheh.
7 For a discussion over the results of adopting a nationality law by British Mandate, while 
Palestine is not an independent sovereign State, see Bentwich, 230. The fact that it was pos­
sible to appeal to the Crown Privy Council by Palestinian courts did not undermine 
Palestinian nationality. Bentwich, 230-232.
8 Qafisheh, 98. As for Iraq and Trans-Jordan, the nationality laws were enacted by local author­
ities in 1924 and 1928 respectively. As for Cameroon, Togoland and Tanganyika, also under
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As discussed, the League of Nations specifically requested that a nationality 
law be adopted to realize one of the Mandate objectives, establishing a national 
homeland for Jews.9 This was so significant that the Order of 1925 was enacted 
by an Order in Council, which sits at the top of the hierarchy of legislative 
edicts under the mandate.10 Such an endeavor was also given the weight it 
merited by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, as they were involved in the draft­
ing process of the Order and other relevant legislation.* 11 A draft was apparently 
ready from 1922, but Britain did not adopt it until a peace agreement with 
Turkey was concluded.12
Such facts created an awkward situation which can be formulated as 
follows: Britain exercised sovereign powers over Palestine, including the 
adoption of a nationality law; Palestine under the British Mandate was distin­
guishable from Britain; but in historical Palestine at the time, there was no 
other independent and sovereign state besides Britain. Palestinian citizens 
were protected abroad by Britain; Mandate Palestinians were treated by British 
law and courts as alien subjects; but allegiance to the British Mandate govern­
ment of Palestine was considered as allegiance to the same Crown.13
For Britain, Palestinians were not British citizens. Bentwich argues that the 
position of Palestine under the mandate, and the protection of Palestinian 
subjects abroad, was similar to that in British Protectorate. Whereas Palestinians 
were represented by British Authority abroad, but were deemed alien subjects 
for British Law proper, as the Order was intended to create a Palestinian citi­
zenship apart from British Nationality.14 At the same time, mandate Palestinians 
were the citizens of no other sovereign state but were subjects of the crown, 
and citizens of the Government of Palestine -  a non-state government under 
the sovereign authority of Britain.15
British mandate, no nationality legislation was passed and inhabitants were con­
sidered British protected persons. For more, see Qafisheh (98) and the literature cited 
therein.
9 See supra note 2.
10 Qafisheh, 102-103.
11 Ibid, 12-13.
12 Ibid, 81. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 and came into force for Britain 
(which by then was the Mandatory for Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Iraq), on 6 August 1924 
(Ibid, 87).
13 Bentwich, 232.
14 Ibid, 231.
15 It may be useful for other researchers to study citizenship for non-independent and non- 
recognized states. See for example, Andrew Grossman, “Nationality and the Unrecognized 
State,” International Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no.4 (2001): 849-876.
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Under those circumstances, the Order realized the objectives of the man­
date by amending certain provisions within Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869, 
so as, for example, to restrict the right of those bom in Palestine, but who hap­
pen to reside outside Palestine, to access citizenship,16 or by adopting entirely 
new provisions, such as those related to naturalization, expatriation, repatria­
tion, and the nationality of married women and children.17
In particular, the Order changed the provision for citizenship in three 
ways:18
1) The Order regulated acquisition of British-Palestine citizenship by ‘natural 
Palestinians’ -  Ottoman national residents in Palestine. This provision was 
restrictive for thousands of persons, born in Palestine, who happened to be out­
side Palestine (for business, study, or tourism) on the given date.19 Those per­
sons could apply for Palestinian citizenship through naturalization, but the 
granting of citizenship was under the complete discretion of the government. 
Out of 9,000 applications submitted from 1925 to 1936, roughly only 100 were 
accepted.20 Satisfying the conditions provided by law was not enough to acquire 
Palestinian citizenship, as Article 2 of the Order states; the Government of 
Palestine “in its absolute discretion" could choose ultimately whether to grant 
or withhold Palestinian nationality.21 As a result, thousands of persons became 
stateless as they lost Turkish nationality,22 while not being granted Palestinian
16 Qafisheh, 132-133.
17 Ibid, 109.
18 Ibid, 26-27.
19 Ibid, 123-124,131.
20 Ibid, 135-136. The numbers clearly show the results of the use of discretion by the British
Government of Palestine (Ibid, 138-139) (table is mine):
Year Number of persons bom in Palestine, 
residing abroad, who were 
naturalized Palestinians
Number of Foreign Jews 
naturalized in Palestine
1928 78 4635
1937 64 21,542
1938 92 17.988
21 Ibid, 135.
22 Precise statistics about the total of Palestinian natives who were residing abroad on 6 
August 1924 are lacking. However, it was estimated in 1927 that the number of Palestine’s 
natives in Europe and the Americas constituted 25,000. By 1936, it was reported that the 
figure had risen to 4 0 ,0 0 0  (Ibid, 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 ) .
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nationality. Their recourse to the Palestinian judiciary (under the mandate) 
was in vein, following the Supreme Court of Palestine, sitting as High Court of 
Justice, in Kattaneh v. Chief Immigration Officer of 16 December 1927.23
2) The introduction of naturalization as a process through which the 
Mandate Citizenship Law enabled the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship for 
some 130,000 foreigners (by 1946), 99% of whom were Jews.24 The decision was 
adopted by the High Commissioner and was not subject to appeal.25 In addi­
tion to that, it has been ruled that “a British subject who acquires Palestinian 
citizenship by naturalization, as has been done in a number of cases by British 
Jews settled in Palestine, does not thereby lose his British nationality. He does 
not change his allegiance by adopting Palestinian citizenship, and therefore 
retains his allegiance to the Crown.”26 An encouraging legal reasoning enabled 
British Jews to settle in Palestine under the British Mandate and acquire this 
new Palestinian citizenship without losing their British nationality -  at a time 
when dual nationality was forbidden both in Britain, and by the Order itself.
3) The Order regulated expatriation and the loss of nationality, as a result of, 
inter alia, acquisition of another nationality, the revocation of nationality as 
punishment, and the marriage of Palestinian women with a foreigner, in ways 
that made it possible for many Palestinians to lose their nationality.
Ill Citizenship Regulation of Host Countries vis-a-vis the Palestinians
The British Mandate came to an end by unilateral British decision on May 14, 
1948, the date in which Israel declared ‘independence’ and claimed sovereignty 
over the territories they controlled as a result of the war (most of historical 
Palestine). Palestinians in Israel became with time Israeli citizens,27 while refu­
gees were unable to return because of Israeli refusal, with a small number of
23 Ibid, 134. For a discussion of the interpretation of habitual resident’ by the Supreme 
Court of Palestine, see Ibid, H4ff.
24 Ibid, 160. While there is a clear disagreement on the exact ratio of Arabs to Jews in Palestine 
under the British Mandate, it is clear that Arabs were the overwhelming majority at the time 
the British Mandate began. For an example of the calculation of Arabs to Jews in Palestine, 
see Ibid, 120. With time, the gap in numbers narrowed in favor of Jews as a result of the 
British Mandate policies and regulations as explained in this paper.
25 Ibid, 154.
26 Bentwich, 232, emphasis added.
27 It is true that Palestinians in Israel became Israeli citizens, but it is not obvious that they 
enjoyed equal citizenship. For more see, Nimer Sultany, Citizens without Citizenship 
(Haifa: Arab Center for Applied Social Research -  Mada, 2003).
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exceptions, to permit their re-entry and thus access citizenship. While at the 
same time, Israel enacted several amendments to the nationality law enabling 
Jews, with a few exceptions, in any part of the world to immigrate to Israel and 
acquire Israeli citizenship.28 The Israeli Nationality Law of 1952, together with 
the Law of (Jewish) Return, and the Absentees’ Property Law, enabled Israel to 
grant a group of Palestinians citizenship, and rejected many others, whether 
those who happened to be outside the territories under Israel’s control, or who 
did not satisfy the Israeli Nationality Law conditions.29
Egypt kept (British) Palestinian citizenship intact while maintaining Gaza 
under its complete control; Palestinians declared an All-Palestine government 
in Gaza, but effectively never enjoyed sovereignty over the Gaza Strip or the 
Palestinian people.30 However, the lack of independence for the Gaza Strip and 
Palestine was not an obstacle to accepting the continuity of British Palestinian 
citizenship, in the same way one would accept the possibility of having 
Palestinian citizenship under the British Mandate in the first place. The lack 
of national sovereignty and independence for Palestinians meant only that 
protection abroad for Palestinians of Gaza (Gazans), and representation 
was theoretically the responsibility of the Egyptian authorities, nothing 
more. Gazans in Egypt, nonetheless, and despite initial welcome by Egyptian 
authorities -  in particular at the time of Jamal Abdel Nasser -  were denied 
access to Egyptian nationality, to public schools and universities (unless they 
paid high fees as other foreigners did), and to free health care. Egypt did not 
permit u n r w a  to offer its services in Egypt. At the same time, when Egypt
28 I thank one of the reviewers for his input and clarification of this point.
29 Abbas Shiblak, "Stateless Palestinians,” Forced Migration Review 23 (2006): 8-9. As pointed 
out by Dugard and Reynolds, “Israel denies Palestinian refugees now living in the [occu­
pied Palestinian territory] who fled their homes inside the Green Line the right of return, 
reside and obtain citizenship in the successor state (Israel) now governing the land of 
their birth” (John Dugard and John Reynolds, “Apartheid, International Law, and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory,” European Journal of International Law 24, no.3 (2013): 8g6. 
In that same direction, Nagan and Haddad assert, “What makes a final settlement com­
plex is that there are now some 6.3 million (absentee) Palestinians whose citizenship 
rights were abrogated by internal Israeli legislative and administrative measures” 
(Winston P Nagan and Aitza M Haddad, “The Legal and Policy Implications of the 
Possibility of Palestinian Statehood,” U.C. DavisJournal o f International Law and Policy 18, 
no.2 (2012): 372.
30 The All-Palestine Government disappeared with the death of its prime minister in 1963, 
following which the Arab League convened some Palestinians in 1964 and established the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, acting since then as the unique representative of the 
Palestinian people (Khalil 2007,24).
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ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, Egypt denied u n h c r  from having any 
responsibility towards Palestinians.31
The West Bank became part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Palestinians in the West Bank, as well as Palestinian refugees who fled Palestine 
because of the 1948 war and were present in any of the territories of the newly 
established Kingdom of Jordan, became Jordanian citizens according to 
Jordanian Nationality Law No. 6 of 1954. Most of them retainjordanian citizen­
ship. Palestinians of Gaza, including the refugees who fled to Gaza first in 1948, 
were not candidates for Jordanian citizenship and were dealt with as any other 
foreign persons in Jordan. The Jordanian Nationality Law served to distribute 
rights between members of the same people and former residents of the same 
territory, depending on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the conditions 
imposed by the Jordanian state’s new nationality law.
Even when in 1967, thousands of Palestinians of Gaza, displaced as a result 
of the Israeli attack and occupation, fled to Jordan from Egypt, they were 
denied access to citizenship and were still dealt with as foreigners in Jordan.32 
West Bank Palestinians continued to be de jure Jordanian Nationals, but de 
facto rendered stateless as a result of Israeli occupation, which disconnected 
them from the state whose nationality they were enjoying until then. It is note­
worthy that Palestinians of the West Bank continued to enjoy certain travel 
facilities and access to services in Jordan proper, even after the 1967 occupa­
tion. Such a situation remained so until the unilateral declaration on July 31, 
1988, of the administrative and legal separation of the West Bank, by the 
Jordanian King, ending all Jordanian claims on the West Bank (with the excep­
tion of East Jerusalem), which prepared the terrain for the p l o  declaration of 
Independence in Algiers in November 15,1988.
The state of Palestine did not result, as a matter of fact, from a declaration, 
as occupation persisted while West Bank Palestinians had no more access to 
any rights and freedoms granted for Jordanian citizenship. De facto stateless 
Palestinians of the West Bank became de jure stateless persons again. But there 
are cases where, even those Palestinians of Jordan who had been granted 
Jordanian nationality, and maintained it after 1988, were denaturalized if, after 
the Oslo agreements, they received a Palestinian Authority (p a ) passport -  
despite recognizing it only as a travel document issued by a non-state entity.
Nationalization and naturalization processes, the denial thereof, and then 
again de-nationalization and de-naturalization processes, that took place in
31 For more, see Khalil 2011.
32 See Oroub El-Abed, “Immobile Palestinians: Ongoing Plight of Gazans in Jordan,” Forced 
Migration Review no. 26 (2006): 17-18.
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Palestine or on Palestinians by state authorities fragmented the Palestinians 
and separated them into various groups and sub-groups, each subject to differ­
ent kinds of restrictions and each having access to different kind of rights and 
freedoms. This resulted in what I have previously called a legal matrix, to indi­
cate how legal status is not defined in general and abstract norms, but is largely 
dependent on contingent conditions related to the kind of Palestinians whose 
status is being defined.33
In 1967, when Israel occupied, inter alia, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, two 
military administrations were established. East Jerusalem was separated from 
both territories, and then annexed to Israel, despite the illegality of annexation 
of occupied territories under international law.34 For the Israeli military, and 
then civil administrations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the local popula­
tion registered by general census taking place immediately after the war was 
considered as made up of foreign residents.35 East Jerusalemites were offered 
Israeli citizenship (in exchange for forfeiting their Jerusalemite identification, 
but the vast majority did not take up the offer). As for those who were forcibly 
displaced as a result of the war, or who happened to be outside those areas at 
the time the censuses took place, they simply could not access the areas and 
could not obtain an identification number issued by Israeli authorities unless 
through a long, painful and often unsuccessful process of family unification. 
To be sure, both Palestinians who were lucky enough to obtain an identifica­
tion number, and those who were denied that number, were not citizens of the 
state of Israel, or of any other state. They were de facto stateless,36 while 
Palestinian citizenship (established by the mandate) arguably remained intact, 
from a legal perspective.
33 Khalil 2011.
34 Although the 1948 partition resolution envisioned Jerusalem and its surroundings as an 
international area under the supervision of the United Nations, this was never achieved; as 
a result of the 1948 ceasefire Jerusalem was, as a matter of fact, separated in two, the western 
part under the newly established state of Israel and the Eastern part, including the Old City, 
under Jordan. In 1967 Israel occupied East Jerusalem with the rest of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. In 1980, Israel annexed Jerusalem by a Basic Law called “The Jerusalem Law,’’ an annex­
ation deemed illegal by the United Nations Security Council resolution 478 of the same year.
35 Asem Khalil, Irregular Migration into and through the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
CARIM Analytic & Synthetic Notes No. 2009/19, Florence, i t : Robert Shuman Center for 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2009.
36 The West Bank Palestinians became de facto stateless in 1967 as a result of Israeli occupa­
tion of the West Bank which disconnected them from the Jordanian state. In 1988, with 
the unilateral declaration of disengagement, West Bank Palestinians became also de jure 
stateless.
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I have studied earlier Israeli measures with regards to Palestinian residents 
of the areas, including the way the registration process of the local population 
took place, family unification processes, exit and entry regulations, etc.37 In 
those research papers, I concluded, as many others also have, that such mea­
sures reflected clear Israeli policies that aimed at minimizing the number of 
Palestinians in the areas under Israeli control, and maintained and intensified 
the fragmentation that pre-existed between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
As a matter of fact, Gaza Strip Palestinians were identified differently from 
West Bank Palestinians, and over time the former became, for the purposes of 
Israeli military orders, illegal infiltrators if present in the West Bank without an 
Israeli permit.38
The establishment of the p a , and the possibility of issuing pa  travel docu­
ments, did not change the way an identification number was granted -  it 
remained a prerogative of Israeli authorities, although this time with the inter­
mediate role of the p a . Even the change of residence between the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, and vice versa, remained subject to Israeli approval, which 
became with time, in particular after the second Intifada in 2000, a near impos­
sible objective. Similarly, the control of borders of both the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip remained an exclusive Israeli prerogative.39
Particularly relevant is the case of East Jerusalem, separated dejure by Israeli 
law (the so called ‘unification’ of Jerusalem, was deemed illegal by the inter­
national community) as well as de facto from the rest of the occupied 
Palestinian territories. Its Palestinian residents held a different identification 
card, issued by the Israeli Ministry of Interior, and subjected the holders to
37 See for example, Asem Khalil, Family Unification o f Residents in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, carim  Analytic and Synthetic Notes no.2009/19, Florence, IT: Robert Schuman 
Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2009; Asem Khalil, Impact of 
Israeli Military Order N0.1650 of 2009 on Palestinians’ Rights to Legally Reside in their own 
Country, carim  Analytic and Synthetic Notes -  Legal Module, carim -as 2010/46, 
Florence, it : Robert Shuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 
2010; Khalil 2007; Khalil 2011; Asem Khalil, “Palestine: the Legal Dimension of Migration,” 
Mediterranean Migration (2006-2007 report),” (ed.) Philippe Fargues, Florence, it : Robert 
Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2007, 195-205; 
Asem Khalil, “Palestine: the Legal Dimension of Migration,” Mediterranean Migration 
(.2008-2009 report)," (ed.) Philippe Fargues, Florence, IT: Robert Schuman Center for 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2009,267-277.
38 See Khalil 2010.
39 A different situation exists for the Rafah crossing, after the unilateral withdrawal in 2005. 
Analyzing the way this crossing is now functioning goes beyond the limited scope of this 
paper.
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many restrictions related to their travel, residency, and family unification, 
together with tough Israeli measures aimed at limiting their access to permits 
to build new houses. Palestinians of East Jerusalem were also considered for­
eign residents in Israel, but they do have access to most services of the state of 
Israel, with freedom of movement within Israel denied to other Palestinian 
populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. East Jerusalem Palestinians 
can travel using Israeli travel documents, and also still have the right to 
Jordanian citizenship and travel documents, even after the separation of the 
West Bank from Jordan in 1988.
Amendments introduced to the Israeli Nationality Law by Temporary Order, 
the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law -  first passed in July 2003, renewed 
over the years since, and approved as constitutional by the Israeli Supreme 
Court -  rendered the situation for Palestinians of East Jerusalem even more 
difficult since West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians did not qualify for auto­
matic citizenship or residency in case of marriage to an Israeli citizen or to a 
Palestinian of East Jerusalem. This meant that mixed families (meaning simply 
when one partner holds Israeli citizenship or an East Jerusalem identification 
number, and the other is a Palestinian from the West Bank or the Gaza Strip), 
when married, were unable to legally reside together inside Israel (or East 
Jerusalem). More restrictive measures were imposed on East Jerusalem 
Palestinians; they risked losing their identification number if they were discov­
ered to be living outside the Jerusalem area. This meant that a mixed family, in 
the way defined above, cannot live legally inside Israel, nor can they live in the 
West Bank or Gaza, without risking something (in the first case prison and fine, 
and in the second the loss of an identification card).
Palestinians who, after 1967, were outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
including the thousands of 1948 Palestinian refugees and their children, 
remained in host countries, or tried to emigrate to third countries. Those who 
remained in Lebanon were subject to various restrictive measures on their 
socioeconomic rights and freedoms, including the right to work, to health ser­
vices and to education. Except for some Christians in the early years, Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon were denied access to Lebanese citizenship, even after 
decades of residency. Male Palestinian refugees are also denied citizenship 
through family unification in cases of mixed marriages with Lebanese women. 
Children of those mixed marriages (when the wife is Lebanese), are denied 
citizenship as citizenship in Lebanon is transferred through fathers alone. 
In Syria, before the current civil war, Palestinians enjoyed all rights citizens 
enjoy (with some exceptions with regards to ownership of certain properties). 
They were explicitly denied access to Syrian citizenship through long resi­
dence, but could enjoy under certain conditions access to citizenship through
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family unification. In Egypt, before the change of regime in 2011, Palestinians 
were denied access to most socioeconomic rights, and were dealt with as for­
eign residents despite long residency. They were also denied access to citizen­
ship, even through family unification in mixed families (when the wife is 
Egyptian). In Jordan, Gazans were and still are dealt with as any other foreign 
group, with regards to access to socioeconomic rights. After 1988, West Bank 
Palestinians suffered from the same treatment. Both groups have very limited 
access to citizenship as a result of long residence and family unification, in 
cases where the woman is a Jordanian citizen.
The above restrictions on access to citizenship were coherent with the so- 
called 1965 Casablanca Protocol on the treatment of Palestinian refugees, and 
successive resolutions, which recommended member states of the Arab 
League not naturalize Palestinians so as to keep their identity alive.40 The 
second most important approach of the Casablanca Protocol and successive 
resolutions was reflected in the provision that host countries should provide 
travel documents for Palestinians, making it possible for Palestinian refugees 
to access services and rights as citizens of the host state while maintaining 
their status as refugees.41 Such approaches to the question of Palestinian refu­
gees are not necessarily compatible but they reflect the perspective Arab states 
held towards the presence of Palestinian refugees: it was only temporary. 
Why integrate Palestinian refugees if their presence was ultimately temporary 
anyway?42
IV Citizenship is the Solution, not Statehood
The title I gave to this section includes, admittedly, a strong statement if one 
considers the long years Palestinians struggle to have their right to self-deter­
mination, including the right to establish a state of their own, be recognized. 
The latest move aimed at obtaining the status of a non-member state by a u n  
General Assembly Resolution was the latest step in that direction, considered 
to be a diplomatic victory for Palestinians supported by the majority of states 
and the isolation of both Israel and the usa on this issue. It seems also a strong 
statement, if one considers the p l o ’s historic move to accept, timidly in the
40 See for example, Abbas Shiblak, “Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees 
in Arab Countries "Journal o f Palestine Studies 25, no.3 (1996): 36-45.
41 Ibid, 38-39.
42 For a more thorough discussion of the Casablanca Protocol, compared to the International 
Refugee Law convention, and host countries’ domestic laws, see Khalil 2011.
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1970s but then publicly and proudly, the idea of two states, where a state of 
Palestine is established and lives peacefully with its neighbor Israel on the 
foundation of the Partition Plan, intrinsically amended by the events and bor­
ders recognized by the international community as the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories of 1967.
The argument I am advancing is simple. To empower stateless Palestinians, 
most of whom are refugees, displaced and/or those denied re-entry to their 
homeland, and/or to the territories that are currently under the p a  control, 
and which is a candidate, together with the rest of the Palestinian territories 
occupied in 1967, to become the territory of the state of Palestine, it is abso­
lutely necessary to grant them citizenship in and of an independent and sover­
eign state. Not only is this an obligation under modern international law which 
aims at limiting and diminishing the number of stateless people, but citizen­
ship also enables people to move freely, to enjoy political, civil, economic, 
social and cultural rights more easily, and because citizenship entails protec­
tion in third countries, at a time when it is much needed.43
That is why I have asserted in the title of this section that what is needed for 
stateless Palestinians is primarily citizenship more than statehood; even more, 
the value of statehood as a Palestinian national objective is intrinsically con­
nected to the consequences related to the establishment of a state with provid­
ing stateless Palestinians a recognized citizenship. This explains the intentional 
use of undefined words with regards to which state nationality stateless refu­
gees may be enjoying. It can be indeed the citizenship of an internationally 
recognized Palestinian state; an option which largely depends on the creation 
of that state, and the enjoyment of sovereign powers over a territory and a 
people, the independence of which is recognized by other states. It can also be 
Israeli citizenship, as Israel arguably has the obligation as a successor state not
43 Of course I assume, as many authors do, that West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians are, 
at least, de facto stateless as much as most Palestinian refugees in host countries for the 
lack of a recognized state from which they can claim citizenship. I recognize that this is a 
different conclusion than that of Qafisheh (21-22) from which interesting thesis stemmed 
most of my analysis related to Mandate Palestinian citizenship. Accepting that 
Palestinians are indeed stateless does not mean I accept they remain so, or that they do 
not have the right to statehood, based on British mandate established Palestinian citizen­
ship, or even being recognized as citizenship in statu nascendi as some authors had con­
cluded. See for example, Andreas Zimmermann, “The Nationality of the Inhabitants of 
the Palestinian Autonomous Territories,” in New Political Entities in Public and Private 
International Law with Special Reference to the Palestinian Entity, (eds.) Amos Shapira 
and MalaTabory, Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer Law International, 1999, as cited by 
Qafisheh (21-22).
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to deny citizenship of the citizens of the former state (the (British) Government 
of Palestine, or Mandate Palestine). This is an option that many Israelis exclude 
categorically for what they conceive as a threat to the nature of their state as a 
Jewish state.44 Another option may be the naturalization in host countries, or 
in third countries, in case of the unwillingness of third countries. Such an 
option is rejected so far by most host countries as a matter of principle, even if 
Jordan alone had admitted that right in fact for those who satisfied the condi­
tions of the Jordanian Nationality Law.
Based on the above, and given the lack of alternative options, one cannot 
but conclude that granting Palestinian citizenship for Palestinian refugees in 
host countries seems to be the most suitable and probable solution, whenever 
the condition of statehood is satisfied. The establishment of the state of 
Palestine seems to be satisfying the interests of all concerned parties, including 
the Israelis, from finding a solution, even if temporary, to the question of refu­
gees, without having to deal with their possible return to the current state of 
Israel.
Possible critiques for this option (establishment of the state of Palestine 
which in turn grants all stateless Palestinians with Palestinian citizenship) may 
be found in the fear of a negative impact on the right of return. It is also pos­
sible to fear granting of such a citizenship as a possible reason for de-national- 
ization of Palestinians currently enjoying a citizenship of a recognized state. 
What would the reaction of Israel be if some of its Palestinian citizens acquire 
the citizenship of the newly established state of Palestine? And why should 
we expect Jordan not to take similar steps aiming at de-nationalizing some of 
its citizens (of Palestinian origin), in case they acquire the citizenship of the 
state of Palestine, when it is known this occurred when they received a pa  
travel document? What about the possibility of mass displacement of refugees
44 The awkward legal trick Israel uses is simple: In order to be able to enjoy the citizenship 
of the newly established state, you need to be legally residing in Israel at the time pro­
vided by law. But in order to be legally residing, you have to be admitted through the 
borders -  a condition which all Palestinians who fled as a result of the war, or who were 
outside the country at the time the census took place, could not realize. This is a position 
that contradicts with international obligations of the newly established state, and contra­
dicts un resolutions, in particular those related to the readmission of Palestinian refu­
gees. As pointed out also by Elsayed-Ali: “The Palestinian refugee problem is uniquely 
complex, protracted and significant. One of its peculiar aspects is that most Palestinian 
refugees want to return to their homes and/or lands but are unable to do so not because 
of a fear of persecution -  commonly found in other refugee situations -  but because they 
will not be allowed to enter Israel by the Israeli authorities.” Sherif Elsayed-Ali, “Palestinian 
Refugees in Lebanon,” Forced Migration Review 26 (2006): 13.
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outside the borders of host countries, even if they were unwilling to leave? 
Could we not imagine steps like the one by former Libyan leader, Muammar 
Al-Gaddafi, in 1995 when he expelled from Libya 5,000 Palestinians holding 
Lebanese refugee travel documents, and who were left with no place to return 
after Lebanon imposed restrictions on their re-entry? Or something similar to 
the mass expulsion and displacement of Palestinians from Kuwait after the 
first Gulf War, and from Iraq after the second war, and now from Syria? Another 
critique may be a risk of mass nationalization (or naturalization) processes of 
Palestinian refugees as endangering the sustainability of the state of Palestine 
due to mass migration towards the new state of Palestine.
Such fears are legitimate as they may effectively result from adopting such 
an orientation. Worse, all those scenarios may take place even before a recog­
nized state is established. Although citizenship is usually related to a state, it is 
a fact that Palestinian nationality existed before 1948 and was regulated by the 
mandate citizenship law, although there was no Palestinian state proper.45 The 
same reasoning applies to accepting the existence of Palestinian citizenship in 
Gaza under Egyptian control between 1948 and 1967. A scenario which fails to 
recognize Palestinian nationality is catastrophic because it will result in new 
dilemmas of the kind of mass de-nationalization on the one hand, and mass 
displacement on the other, with no state of Palestine to enter nor a Palestinian 
citizenship that offers diplomatic protection enabling the enjoyment of rights 
and freedoms. But in case of a recognized independent Palestinian state, the 
scenarios above are not inevitable. Putting this scenario aside, let me try to 
answer the three critiques above, admitting that offering citizenship for state­
less Palestinians after the establishment of a Palestinian state is taking place.
One may argue successfully, as many others have, that the right of return to 
the country of origin is not affected as a right by enjoying the citizenship of a 
recognized state. The right of return will continue to depend on the interna­
tional community's willingness to impose on the state which prevents the real­
ization of that right a requirement to permit the re-entry of refugees. Obtaining 
citizenship in that sense will not affect either negatively or positively such an 
option. I suggest, rather, that the two-state solution appears to be safer from 
the perspective of refugee law for keeping the right to return to the country 
of origin alive.46 In case of a one-state solution, the re-entry to Ramallah or
45 For a discussion, see Qafisheh, r8.
46 Concerning the differentiation between the return to the state of Palestine and the right 
of return, apparently Bisharat reaches similar conclusion: “Meanwhile, Palestinian refu­
gees living in exile would benefit from a two-state solution only to the extent that they 
receive the rights to return to their homes and homeland and to receive compensation for
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Nablus means indeed the return to the country of origin, Palestine. The prob­
lem would be internal displacement and nothing more, the regulation of 
which, and contrary to international refugee law, is still subject to soft interna­
tional law. In the case of a two-state solution, the return to the state of Palestine 
would not affect the right to return to their country of origin which is a differ­
ent state, the state of Israel. Also, rejecting the idea of offering Palestinian 
citizenship to Palestinian refugees in host countries in the name of the right 
of return would be as awkward as advocating for the denial of Palestinian citi­
zenship to the refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (who form over two 
thirds of the population in Gaza,47 and over one quarter of the population in 
the West Bank) .48
The second fear is completely legitimate given the known actions of host 
countries. Jordan is likely to be more aggressive in applying the legal ban on 
dual Arab nationality for those Jordanian citizens obtaining (or applying for) 
Palestinian citizenship. Although relevant, such an option would apply only to 
those who consciously choose between the two nationalities. Moreover, it is 
possible to envisage bilateral agreements that enable the favorable treatment 
between citizens of the states rendering the acquisition of Palestinian citizen­
ship a luxury for a Palestinian holding a Jordanian citizenship. However, for 
Gazans in Jordan, having a Palestinian citizenship may result in an empowering 
reality, enabling them to reside legally, to travel freely, and to obtain work, etc.
As for the fear of mass displacement resulting in possible expulsion from 
host countries as a result of an automatic nationalization process of all state­
less Palestinians by the newly established state of Palestine, this is also a seri­
ous risk and possible scenario. However, most states, even the poorest in terms 
of protection of human rights, may find it difficult to justify such steps which 
are deemed to be illegal and punishable by international law as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and/or a crime against peace. Also, the changing
their losses. As many Palestinian refugees fled from areas that will remain within Israel 
under a two-state solution, their rights of return will be only imperfectly realized.” George 
E. Bisharat, “Re-Democratizing Palestinian Politics,” ucla Journal o f International Law and 
Foreign Affairs 17, no.1-2 (2013): 8.
47 According to the 2007 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (pcbs ) census, the refugee 
population of the Gaza Strip was 67.9% compared to 65.1% in 1997. For more, see press 
release announcing results of the pcbs 2007 census: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/ 
_pcbs/PressRelease/gaza_census_e.pdf
48 According to the 2007 pcbs census, the refugee population of the West Bank was 28.1% 
compared to 26.6% in 1997. For more, see press release announcing results of the pcbs 
2007 census: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Census_2007e.pdf
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politics of the Arab world means measures of such relevance and importance 
would likely be difficult to implement and accommodate.
The last critique is connected to the sustainability of the newly established 
state of Palestine, assuming it was united and independent, and its ability to 
accommodate hundreds of thousands of nationalized or naturalized Pales­
tinians. Such a critique, although a serious one, assumes that all refugees would 
choose to apply for Palestinian citizenship, and if admitted as citizens, would 
chose to take up their right to (re-)entry into the newly established Palestine. 
While those two assumptions are not so obvious for various reasons, the grant­
ing of citizenship may be accompanied with clear policies of readmission of 
citizens residing abroad, with some needed organization for such measures in 
practical terms -  in a manner that should not be considered discriminatory or 
arbitrary.
Finally, the establishment of a state would not affect Palestinian refugees’ 
right of return, including the rights of restitution, and the right to compensa­
tion, even if they acquire the citizenship of a newly established sovereign 
Palestinian state, or any other state. The p l o  will remain the one responsible 
for representing Palestinians in their quest for the fulfillment of all the above 
rights.
V Conclusion
With the exception of Palestinians who were considered or naturalized as 
Palestinians, and who remained so with time along with their ancestors, most 
other Palestinians in host Arab countries are stateless. They suffer in their right 
to movement and in their right to obtain a legal permit of entry and residency 
in third countries. Their access to work, education and health facilities is also 
restricted, together with their right to own properties, houses, lands, etc.
To travel, Palestinian refugees need a travel document issued by the host 
country, usually issued for a limited period of time; they often49 need a visa to 
access any other state, including those which host other Palestinian refugees 
(for example, a refugee registered in Lebanon needs a visa to enter Jordan, and 
vice versa). On some occasions, Palestinian refugees have needed a visa to re­
enter the host country who issued them a travel document (as has occurred in 
Lebanon and Egypt).
49 With the exception of Palestinian refugees moving between Syria and Lebanon, where 
Palestinians officially do not need a visa.
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The current political crises in Egypt and Syria have shown how vulnerable 
stateless Palestinians are in all the neighboring Arab countries.50 Their dis­
placement, internally or outside Syria, resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe 
because there was no other place where Palestinians of Syria could find safe 
refuge while maintaining a legal status, as they have no citizenship of a recog­
nized state. Nor do they have legal residency in any other state. This has also 
been true of the Palestinians in Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya.51 The wayjordan deals 
with Palestinians of Syria who try to enter or have already crossed their bor­
ders, and the way Egypt, since the ousting of Mohammed Morsi, deals with 
Palestinians and the Gaza Strip as a whole, further exemplify how precarious 
the situation of stateless Palestinians is.
Based on historical and legal developments of Palestinian citizenship, one is 
tempted to answer the question the title of this paper poses in a completely 
unexpected way. Rather than asking if citizenship can offer a solution for the
50 As rightly pointed out by Nagan and Haddad (442-443), it is also the result of the inability 
of customary international law to provide protection for stateless people: “[C]urrent 
international law frameworks regarding stateless individuals have proved unable to deal 
effectively with the current problem of Palestinian statelessness. While treaties attempt 
to redress some the problems faced by stateless individuals, the reality is that customary 
international law affords little protection to stateless people who suffer continuing abuses 
by other states”. As Costas Douzinas eloquently observes: "While human rights belong 
supposedly to all human beings on account of their humanity, it is citizenship that turns 
people into human beings by protecting their so-called eternal or inalienable rights... The 
alien is not a citizen. He does not have rights because he is not part of the state and he is 
a lesser human being because he is not a citizen... The alien is the gap between man and 
citizen; between human nature and political community lies the moving refugees." Cited 
in: Savitri Taylor, “Introduction," in Nationality, Refugee Status and State Protection: 
Explorations o f the Gap between Man and Citizen, (ed.) Savitri Taylor, Annandale, Au: The 
Federation Press, 2005,2.
51 After giving various examples of Palestinians in host Arab countries, Kassim reaches a 
similar conclusion: “The above examples demonstrate certain facts and raise certain 
issues, the most relevant of which to my purpose here are: to be a Palestinian means not 
to have a formal citizenship, with the resulting hardships that make tire Palestinian life in 
various communities continuously dangerous; the legal status of a Palestinian in the 
Middle East is always in doubt and left to the political exigencies of each host country; 
and the absence of an internationally recognized State of Palestine will make this agony 
last indefinitely.” Anis Kassim, “The Palestinians: From Hyphenated to Integrated 
Citizenship,” in Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, 
(ed.) Nils A. Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2000,202-203.
M IDDLE EAST LAW AND GOVERNANCE 6 (2 0 1 4 )  2 0 4 - 2 2 4
2 2 4 KHALIL
refugee problem,52 this paper has shown how citizenship regulations were part 
of the problem. The understanding of the distorted historical and legal institu­
tional mechanism of citizenship is necessary for the possible reconciliation of 
Palestinians to be provided for by the empowering institution, a Palestinian 
state.
The understanding of the way citizenship was regulated will help overcome 
the perception of citizenship as an obstacle, deemed part of a colonial project 
that has not yet come to an end, and prepare the terrain for a different argu­
ment of citizenship as a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem without 
citizenship being considered for that reason as an alternative to their right 
of return. Rather, citizenship becomes an empowering institution, which 
can help in creating citizens as agents of change rather than negative subjects 
who are marginalized by decision makers, political processes, and state 
authorities.
To conclude, statelessness is a serious problem for Palestinian refugees in 
host countries. The lack of security for their status as citizens is a real problem 
for many Palestinians enjoying Jordanian citizenship. Granting citizenship is 
not a withdrawal of one’s right to return, nor under the UNRWA operational 
definition of a refugee, a reason to lose rights to u n r w a  services. Accordingly, 
it is possible to think of citizenship as a solution for many Palestinian refugees 
who may be empowered if they enjoy a citizenship of a sovereign state, as 
statelessness is depriving them of their fundamental rights and freedoms.
52 As arguably was done, for example, by, Donna E. Arzt, Refugees Into Citizens: Palestinians 
and the End o f the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 
1997; and, Salman H. Abu-Sitta, From Refugees to Citizens at Home: The End o f the 
Palestinian Israeli Conflict, London, UK: Palestine Land Society and Palestinian Return 
Center, 2001.
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